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Normativity and Objectivity
The Semantic Nature of Objects and the Potentiality of Nature
Roberto Gronda
 
Introduction
1 One  of  the  most  important  contributions  of  pragmatism  to  the  understanding  of
contemporary epistemological concepts is the formulation of a comprehensive account of
objectivity. Through a balanced combination of a) the Kantian insight that objects are
constructions rather than givens, and b) the Hegelian thesis that truth and objectivity are
the outcome of a controlled process of inquiry, pragmatists have argued that objectivity
should  not  be  conceived  of  as  something  independent  of  human  perspective.  Thus,
pragmatists warn us not to use the term ‘objectivity’ in a strong ‘realistic’ and quasi-
metaphysical sense: objectivity does not refer to something outside our space of reasons
which  externally  influences  our  beliefs.  Rather,  it  designates  the  regularity  of  the
relations between our actions and the responses of the external world to them. To be
objective means to be real, universal, and therefore rationally articulated – or, at least,
rationally articulable. William James once said that the trail of the human serpent is over
everything (James 1907/2008: 34). The same must hold true for the notion of objectivity.
2 In the following pages I will address the question of the nature and ground of objectivity
from such a pragmatist perspective. The point of assessing its theoretical validity is to
gain a better understanding of the idea that the pragmatist account of objectivity has a
distinctly Kantian provenance.1 Indeed, one should be careful not to misinterpret the
sense of this assumption. Provenance is not taken to mean bald acceptance; rather, it
consists in a process of critical and creative appropriation of the fundamental tenets of a
tradition. To hold that the pragmatist notion of objectivity belongs to the post-Kantian
tradition means, therefore, that the former should be read as a self-conscious attempt to
come to  terms with the  latter.  Such an attempt  has  both a  positive  and a  negative
component: acceptance goes hand-in-hand with rejection. On the one side, indeed, as a
self-avowedly  post-Kantian  movement,  pragmatism  relies  upon  the  principle  of  the
Normativity and Objectivity
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VII-1 | 2015
1
ontological and epistemological primacy of the spontaneity of human agency. Within the
pragmatist  framework  the  Kantian  insistence  upon  the  primacy  of  spontaneity  is
reformulated as the primacy of those activities (practices) in which human beings are
involved. In doing so, the concept of spontaneity is brought down to earth, and becomes
the core of an empirical and verifiable description of the behaviour of concrete human
beings. As an important aspect of human behaviour, objectivity falls within the scope of
spontaneity, and has therefore to be described in such terms. When seen in this light,
objectivity turns out to be the collective name that we give to the constraints we meet in
our transactions with the world.
3 On the other hand, being a self-avowedly post-Kantian movement – that is, a movement
which is made conscious of the weak points of Kant’s transcendental project as well as its
many strengths – pragmatism cannot accept the dualism of form and matter that has
been  traditionally  associated  with  the  Kantian  constructivist  option.  Post-Kantian
philosophy has convincingly shown the untenability of any constructivist position
holding a certain event or phenomenon (knowledge, aesthetic appreciation, morality) to
be formed out of raw material that is devoid of the quality (cognitive, aesthetic, moral)
which is  characteristic  of  the final  product  we want to account for.  Sellars’s  famous
rejection of  the Myth of  the Given is  part  of  a  wider historical  reaction against  any
reductionist programme aiming to search for an origin of those logical spaces (rational
discourse, ethics, aesthetics, and so on) that determine the way in which human beings
have experience of the world. The adoption of such a standpoint – which may be labelled
‘value holism’ since it relies upon the assumption that semantic holism is a particular
case of  the more general  holistic structure of  human rationality,  centred around the
notion of values – implies therefore that a constructivist account of objectivity cannot be
satisfied  with  the  equation of  the  latter  with  an  alleged raw material  of  knowledge
because such a raw material is nothing but a myth (Sellars 1956/1997).
4 The conjunction of those two trains of thought defines the predicament of any pragmatist
account of objectivity which aims at taking seriously its post-Kantian roots. Indeed, it
seems evident, at least at first glance, that the combined insistence upon spontaneity and
value holism poses a serious threat to the possibility of accounting for the role played by
objective constraints in our rational transactions with the surrounding environment. As a
matter  of  fact,  it  is  difficult  to  escape  the  conclusion that  an account  of  objectivity
hinging upon the idea of  an infinite primacy of  spontaneity –  that  is,  not  limited by
anything  outside  itself  –  ends  up  in  a  denial  of  the  very  possibility  of  objectivity.
McDowell’s depiction of the continuous oscillation between coherentism and the Myth of
the Given can be read as evidence of such theoretical discomfort. It seems that if one puts
the idea of an independent reality aside, one is faced with the pure arbitrariness of their
acts (McDowell 1994).
5 The goal of the article is to show that those two demands – the insistence upon the
primacy  (epistemological  and  ontological)  of  spontaneity  and  the  rejection  of  the
traditional form of constructivism – can be combined in a consistent whole which does
not entail any unpleasant idealistic conclusion, that is, any conclusion which leads to the
denial  of  the  reality  of  objectivity.  To  achieve  this  goal,  I  will  argue  that,  all  the
difficulties above notwithstanding, the insight which lies at the basis of the distinction
between form and content – the idea that there is a way in which things are, and this way
does not  depend upon how an agent  decides to conceptualize the material  –  can be
preserved within a pragmatist framework. No matter what the theoretical framework is
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within which it is formulated, a satisfactory notion of objectivity must recognize the fact
that certain features of  the material  somehow put constraints upon the content and
structure of the activities in which an agent can participate. As Peirce lucidly remarked,
even though the brute quality of empirical experience – what he calls ‘secondity’ – does
not exhaust the meaning of objectivity, it is nevertheless a fundamental aspect of what
we mean by that notion.
6 Objectivity is a stratified concept, as complex as the normative relations that are implied
in human activity. The ultimate aim of this article is to bring to light the complexity of
that concept. The argumentation will proceed as follows. In the first two parts of the
paper I will highlight the deep connection between activity and objectivity, and I will
defend a pluralistic view of experience and reality. In the third section I will discuss the
nature of  common-sense objectivity  in order  to  argue for  its  primacy over  scientific
objectivity. Finally, I will sketch a possible explanation of the relation between common-
sense and scientific practices insisting on the notion of articulation of potentialities. I
shall  maintain that  the notion of  the rational  articulation of  potentialities  should be
acknowledged  as  the  essential  core  of  the  pragmatist  conception  of  objectivity  and
normativity.
 
The Structure of Normativity: From Concepts to
Practices
7 As we have seen,  a  mature,  self-critical  form of  pragmatism needs  to  find a  way to
account for the constraints that human beings meet in their transactions with the world
without relapsing into the Myth of the Given.  A promising solution is to conceive of
normativity as the backbone of objectivity. The advantages of this approach are twofold.
On the one hand, the normative content implicit in the notion of objectivity is brought to
light and emphasized; on the other hand, the nature of objectivity is explained in terms of
a notion which is more directly related to the idea of spontaneity. As a consequence of
this shift of focus from objectivity to normativity, it should be easier to remain within the
scope of a genuine pragmatist investigation of the structure of human rationality.
8 An important clue to a correct formulation of the problem is provided by Kant. Kant has
argued, I think convincingly, that objects and concepts convertuntur. In § 17 of the second
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason he writes that an object is: “that in the concept of
which the manifold of a given intuition is united” (Kant 1781/1998: B137). That insight is
further developed in the section on schematism in which Kant attempts explicitly to
prove the normative character of empirical concepts. The concept of dog, Kant writes:
“signifies a rule in accordance with which my imagination can specify the shape of a four-
footed animal in general, without being restricted to any singular particular shape that
experience offers me or any possible image that I can exhibit in concreto” (Kant 1781/1998:
A141/B180). Thus he suggests that we should not introduce any cognitive break between
object and concept. The semantic content of the object – what the object means for us – is
completely expressible in conceptual terms.
9 If we accommodate this insight within a pragmatist perspective, the Kantian account of
concepts takes a more distinctively practical turn. Concepts can now be defined as rules
(Regeln) that  establish  the  conditions  of  usability  of  an  object  of  a  certain  kind. 2
Paradoxical as it may seem, the structure of any object turns out to be of the form ‘if you
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do this, it will necessarily follow that’ – or, better said, ‘do this in order to achieve that.’
In this  sense,  it  is  clear why and to what extent objectivity has to be regarded as a
normative notion. An object, which consists of its semantic content, is what we could do
with it independently of the fact that we actually undertake the particular kind of action
formulated  by  the  corresponding  notion.  There  is  an  intimate  relation  between
normativity  and  modality,  as  Brandom has  correctly  pointed  out.  On  the  one  hand,
normativity and modality are deeply intertwined since norms are necessary possibilities
(Brandom 2008: 96-7). A diamond is hard even though it is crystallized in the midst of a
cushion of soft cotton, and remains unscratched until the end of its time. But it is also
clear why normativity is related to, and dependent upon, spontaneity. It is always up to
us to decide what to do with a thing. In this sense, it is possible to say that norms are
necessary possibilities.
10 However, while it is up to us to decide what to do with a certain thing, it is not up to us to
decide whether or not that particular thing will actually succeed in satisfying our needs.
It is true that norms are freely established by human beings, and that nothing in the
world can compel us to undertake a certain behaviour or to speak in a certain way. This is
a point that Rorty never tired of highlighting. Nevertheless, the success or failure of the
application of the norms that we have established, or, in more pragmatist terms, of the
tools that human beings have constructed throughout history, testifies to the existence of
a bedrock upon which the spade turns (Wittgenstein 1953/2009: § 217). Such a bedrock is
what we call ‘objectivity.’
11 Here the richness of the vocabulary of normativity comes to our aid. First of all, it is
important to note that the resistance we have experience of is always part of a practice. A
practice is a normatively articulated whole. It establishes its own conditions of possibility,
and  is  consequently  defined  by  the  normative  constraints  it  acknowledges  as  its
legitimate bounds of validity. Every practice displays an internal normativity which is
structured around the relation between a set of means and the end that they claim to
achieve (Frega 2010). Stated in other terms, every practice provides the conditions of
possibility of the usability of the concepts through which the agent attempts to reach that
particular end which defines of the practice in which they are involved. The relation
between concepts and practices is homologous to that between focus and horizon. Every
concept is significant only within a practice, since it is only in the context of a practice
that concepts become truly effective. At the same time, practices are made concrete only
when concepts  are  used  to  control  and  change  the  existing  situations.  Otherwise,  a
practice is only a scheme of possible actions.
12 When resistance is conceived of in the light of the practices in which it appears, it shows
itself to be a normative concept in a twofold sense. On the one hand, resistance can be
said to have a normative content because it is only in the light of the relation between
means  and ends  that  it  becomes  possible  to  determine  what  counts  as  a  significant
resistance, and to establish what is objective within a particular practice. Since such a
relation is instrumental, and since instrumentality is a particular type of normativity, the
pressure  exerted by  the  ‘givenness’  of  things  –  their  quality  or  material  aspect  –  is
‘normativity-laden.’ It is important to notice here that resistance should not be taken
simply in a negative sense. It is simply meant to refer to the fact that the possibilities
which things afford are determinate. If you want to break a glass, the trait to which you
have to pay attention is the hardness of the object you are looking at. If the thing is hard
enough – say, a stone – it affords the possibility of performing the desired action. By
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contrast, if it is not hard enough, you are faced with its uselessness. In both cases, you
cannot overcome the resistance of the object, that is, the determinacy of that which it
affords.  However,  the object affords a resistance only because there is  an underlying
norm stating that a particular quality of the thing under consideration is a hindrance or a
resource to the achievement of the goal that is constitutive of the practice at stake.
13 On the other hand, the notion of resistance turns out to be a normative concept in the
sense that it sets the tasks that other practices – different from the one in which I am
actually engaged – have to accomplish. Within the context of a certain practice an agent
has experience of the determinacy of that which a thing affords – say, the hardness of a
particular stone, what Gibson calls ‘affordance.’3 Now, it is always possible for them to
adopt  a  reflective  stance  as  a  consequence  of  which  that  particular  experience  of
resistance is made an object of analysis at a higher level. The adoption of a reflective
stance is a possibility always available to a rational agent. In doing so, the determinacy of
that which certain things afford is transferred to another level, and becomes the subject-
matter of a higher-level practice.  The relation between the two levels is a normative
relation  because  the  higher-level  practice  is  subject  to  the  authority  of  the  kind  of
resistance that it has to account for. Consequently, resistance is normatively binding for
the concepts through which the agent attempts to understand it.
14 The  two  senses  in  which  resistance  can  be  said  to  have  normative  value  are  not
immediately reducible one to the other.4 Indeed, while in the first case the normative
relation concerns different aspects of a single practice, in the second case the normative
relation holds between elements of different practices. Whilst not completely unrelated, I
think that  it  is  important  to  keep the two senses  separate  in  order  to  preserve the
autonomy of the various practices in which human beings can be involved.
 
What Does “Relative to Practice” Mean?
15 From a pragmatist standpoint objectivity is always relative to a practice. This conclusion
follows directly from the pragmatist principle that the validity of a judgement depends
upon the kind of use that we want to make of it. So, for instance, the judgement “France
is a hexagon” is valid – thence it has objectivity – if and only if there is at least one
practice  in which the utterance of  that  sentence represents  a  successful  move.  Here
‘successful’ means that a certain move actually succeeds in bringing about the desired
result,  where  the  notion  of desired  result  refers  to  the  objective  purpose  that  is
constitutive  of  the  particular  practice  under  consideration.  Dewey’s  naturalistic
conception of needs is useful to clarify this point. The satisfaction of hunger is not a
psychological  event – and here ‘psychological’  means subjective,  private,  but  it  is  an
objective  goal  that  can  be  achieved  only  through  the  objective  modification  of  the
situation from which hunger originates.  The desired result is  the reconstruction of a
harmonic  transaction  between  the  organism  and  its  environment,  and  such
reconstructed harmony is the only legitimate conclusion of the practice.5 A conclusion is
‘legitimate’ if and only if the practice does not simply end or stop in it,  but finds its
accomplishment in bringing about that conclusion. Were it not so, it would be impossible
to  tell  successes  from failures.  If  one  simply  decides  to  stop doing something,  their
decision to quit the activity does not and cannot count as an achievement of the desired
result, even if the practice ends with that very decision and even if the agent can rest
content  with that  decision.  The conditions that  define the success  of  an activity are
Normativity and Objectivity
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VII-1 | 2015
5
completely independent of the will of the agent. It is the practice that establishes its own
conditions  of  satisfaction.  Every  practice  is  autonomous  in  the  Kantian  sense  of
establishing the norms that hold for itself.
16 The latter remarks are particularly important for better clarifying what the pragmatist
conception of objectivity amounts to. First of all, they highlight the fact that the thesis of
the relativity of objectivity to practice is to be taken in its strongest sense if we want to
preserve the genuineness of the insight that is at the heart of the pragmatist tradition –
that is, the Kantian idea that objectivity is in some way dependent upon the standpoint of
a certain subject. This is because a weaker formulation of that idea ends up denying the
theoretical  fertility  of  the  constructivist  option,  thus  opening  the  door  to  the
reinstatement of some form of metaphysical realism. This is a point that deserves some
attention. A weak version of the principle of the relativity of objectivity to practice can be
formulated as follows. Even though a judgement like “France is a hexagon” is not really
valid, it is nevertheless possible to find a practice in which its use leads to the desired
outcome. Indeed, since there are situations in which the desired result can be achieved
with a minimal amount of information, in those situations an indeterminate judgement
can be just as useful as an objectively valid one to reach the particular goal at stake. For
this reason,  so the argument goes,  it  is  possible to distinguish between two types of
objectivity, and consequently between two senses in which judgements can be said to be
objective. Some judgements are objectively valid since they can be successfully used in
every practice in which a judgement of that kind is needed, while others have a very
limited validity, one which is in some sense parasitic to the full-fledged objectivity of the
first type of judgement. The vocabulary of the natural sciences is a good candidate for the
first type of objectivity.
17 The common-sense insight that this account tries to grasp is the idea that a refined tool is
always better and more satisfying than a rudimentary one. Indeed, it seems plausible to
hold that a detailed map is preferable to an overview map even in those cases in which an
agent is satisfied with the information which he receives from the latter. However, no
matter how intuitive it may seem, that insight is misleading, and we should abandon it. It
is not true that a detailed map is always preferable to a less informative one, just as it is
not true that a refined tool is always preferable to a more rudimentary one. In some
cases,  many pieces of information are extremely problematic to handle,  and in those
cases we have the clear impression that there is something wrong in the very idea of a
privileged form of objectivity.
18 In less metaphorical terms, it is a fact of our experience that common-sense judgements
are not always substitutable with scientific judgements salva veritate. If it is very early in
the morning and I ask you when the sun will rise because I am planning to go for a walk, I
will not be satisfied with an answer like: “the sun does not rise because it is the earth that
revolves around it.” Neither can I accept as appropriate an answer such as: “the sun will
rise  in  5 minutes,  3 seconds,  and  400 milliseconds.”  The  correct  reaction  in  both
situations would be that my interlocutor has not understood the kind of practice in which
I am involved. My interlocutor and I do not share the same form of life because we do not
agree on the norms that rule my practice. The general theoretical principle that lies at
the  basis  of  the  two  examples  and  accounts  for  the  failure  of  my  interlocutor  to
appropriately answer my question is that if the semantic richness of a set of concepts – in
more pragmatist terms, the transformative power of a set of tools – sets obstacles to the
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achievement of a goal,  that set of concepts cannot yield objectivity in that particular
practice.
19 This conclusion leads us again to the issue of the autonomy of different practices, and
warns us to pay more attention to the philosophical import of the idea that every practice
establishes its own conditions of satisfaction. Until now, the notion of autonomy has been
used negatively to exorcise the view that it is legitimate to evaluate a certain practice in
terms  of  criteria of  objectivity  drawn  from  different  practices.  But  the  idea  of  the
autonomy of various practices also has a positive content. Indeed, for a practice to be
autonomous means not only that it is clearly distinguishable from other practices, but
also – and more radically – that it is able to create new dimensions of normativity and,
consequently, of objectivity. As is evident, the negative sense of autonomy relies upon the
positive one. Every practice is autonomous only insofar as it establishes its own norms,
provides the context in which these norms can be applied,  defines the conditions of
usability and constructibility of the objects that are significant for the accomplishment of
the desired result, and supplies the normative criterion to judge the objectivity of the
course of action chosen by the agent.
20 Dewey’s notion of encompassing situation as formulated in the seminal article Qualitative
Thought is probably the best description of the normative primacy of practice. According
to Dewey, every situation is characterized by a single emotional quality that runs through
all the different elements that make up that particular situation (Dewey 1932/2008). It is
only because the situation is pervaded by its constitutive quality that it is a situation, and
that the agent who is the central focus of that situation can find it reasonable. Quality is
the concrete norm, a norm that is in the flesh of the objects that compound the situation,
and  is  therefore  a  truly  effective  principle  of  organization,  that  unifies  and  gives
intelligibility  to  a  series  of  events  and  things  that  would  otherwise  be  completely
disconnected. It is the old idealistic insight that the whole comes before its part that
Dewey wants to recover with the notion of the encompassing situation. But within the
idealistic framework the idea of normative holism goes hand-in-hand with the idea that
to be a whole means to have in itself the principle of its own movement – that is, to have
in itself the principle of its own rational articulation. Dewey accepts both theses. For him,
the encompassing situation is to be conceived of as a whole that continuously transforms
itself in a free and autonomous process of self-articulation.6
21 Following Dewey, a practice should therefore be conceived as a whole that articulates
itself  according to the norms that it  has set for itself.  The idea of self-articulation is
important for our purposes. Indeed, it is the activity of self-articulation that explains why
an object’s  resistance  is  always  relative  and internal  to  a  determinate  practice.  The
definition of the affordance of the objects that are relevant to a practice – which is an act
of the constitution of objectivity – is the first step in the process of transforming the
environment  which  finds  its  conclusion  in  the  production  of  the  desired  result.
Everything that plays an effective role in bringing about the result in which the practice
finds its own realization can be said to be objective. This is one of the ways in which
practice articulates itself.
 
The Primacy of Common-Sense
22 In the previous section we focused upon the structure of human agency, on the capacities
of  various  practices  to  create  and  ground  normativity,  and  on  the  notion  of  self-
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articulation. It has been shown that the essence of man is to be normatively responsible.
Human experience, that is to say, the way in which things reveal themselves to us, is
loaded with meanings, and meanings have been conceived of as nets of relations between
an action  and  its  possible  consequences  within  the  context  of  a  particular  practice.
Moreover,  we  have  argued  that  the  autonomy  of  practices  fatally  undermines  any
possible  reductionist  strategy.  The  pluralism of  levels  of  objectivity  is  a  fact  of  our
experience, and we should resist any attempt to question or deny it.
23 Acknowledgment of the intrinsic pluralism of experience does not mean, however, that
every practice is equally ‘fundamental.’ It seems obvious that we should conceive of some
practices as  more central –  speaking of  importance here would be misleading – than
others to the way in which we experience the world. There is an obvious sense in which
searching for food is a practice far more fundamental than searching for psycho-physical
correlations between sensations and brain-states. If we translate the issue in terms of
recognition, as Rorty invites us to (Rorty 2000: 373), we should say that, while we do
recognize someone who cannot understand the practice of searching for psycho-physical
correlations as a member of our community – and, consequently, as a possible participant
in our practices, we would be far less tolerant in the case in which that ‘person’ could not
understand the practice of  searching for food.  In the latter case,  we would probably
conclude that that human-like organism cannot be treated as a person. The thesis of the
autonomy of practices therefore needs to be qualified.
24 It has been observed that the idea of the more fundamental character of some practices
does not entail that these practices are more objective, more real, or more true than
others. It simply means that some practices are inescapable. There are norms that we
cannot call into question because they are constitutive of our being the kind of animals
that we are. These norms cannot be established in scientific or refined practices; they
must be something more basic, more concrete, and far less problematic.
25 An important insight with which to understand the nature of these practices is provided
by what Dewey says about primary experience in the first revised chapter of Experience
and Nature (1929). In those tormented pages, Dewey highlights the distinction between
primary and secondary (or reflective)  experience (Dewey 1925/2008:  15-6).  Secondary
experience is the name that Dewey gives to that particular kind of approach to natural
events which leads to the construction of extremely refined tools which enhance our
understanding of (some aspect of) nature. Primary experience is the life-world, the world
of everyday life. The point that Dewey wants to highlight is that the two worlds – the
world  of  sciences  and  the  life-world  –  are  “epistemologically”  and  “ontologically”
different, the difference between them being due to the fact that they carry out different
functions  in  human experience.  Primary experience is  the  “place”  in  which we first
encounter  reality,  and the  only  “place”  which is  accessible  to  everybody.  Or,  better
stated, if there is a “level of reality” which is accessible to everybody, this is the life-
world.  Secondary experience as reflective experience originates from, and returns to,
that ground-level of  objectivity.  As Dewey points out,  “the subject-matter of primary
experience  sets  the  problems  and  furnishes  the  first  data  of  the  reflection  which
constructs the secondary objects,” while: “the test and verification of the latter is secured
only by return to things of crude or macroscopic experience – the sun, earth, plants and
animals of common, everyday life” (Dewey 1925/2008: 16). Our inability to escape from
the practices that constitute our being the animals we are is the inability to escape from
the horizon of our life-world.
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26 The idea at the basis of Dewey’s concept of experience is the constructivist view according
to which the nature of an object depends upon the attitudes we adopt towards it. As I
read it, primary experience is the name Dewey gives to the set of practices that structure
our life-world – “the sun, earth, plants and animals of common, everyday life.” In order to
avoid possible misunderstandings related to the ambiguity of the notion of experience, I
will call this set of practices ‘common sense,’ and I will emphasize – certainly in a more
radical  way than Dewey actually  does  –  their  biological  grounding.  According to  my
reading, Dewey’s views on primary experience should be translated as follows: human
beings have a natural endowment that determines, in some sense of this word, the types 
of practices in which they are necessarily engaged (searching for food,  searching for
company, and so on) as well as the kinds of objects that they will encounter in the world.
There is nothing metaphysical in the notion of necessity introduced here. It is a biological
necessity, a basic fact of our life: the fact that without food human beings die; the fact
that necessarily, that is, for adaptive reasons, we see things in a three-dimensional space,
and so on. Thus, the various cultures can decide, and have actually decided. But here the
term ‘decide’ is misleading because it opens the door to intellectualism – how to specify
those generalities? The history of  human civilization is  the history of  the process of
refinement  and broadening of  the potentialities  of  human nature:  our  vocabulary of
common-sense – the vocabulary that we of the 21st century use to speak of our life-world
–  is  the  fruit  of  choices  made  thousand  years  ago,  and  continuously  modified  in
transmission from generation to generation.
27 The most fundamental practices are, therefore, those in which the natural constraints –
that is, the constraints imposed upon us by our nature – are stronger. The inability to
escape from these practices is the way in which our biological constitution manifests
itself on a normative level. In this qualified sense, the kind of objectivity constructed in
these practices can be said to constitute the ground-level of objectivity. Their objectivity
is more fundamental that than of scientific practices because they provide the horizon of
possibility of the latter.
 
Potentialities of Things: The Ontological Import of
Constructivism
28 When these ideas are expressed in an ontological language it is probably easier to
understand what is at stake. Every practice is a principle of constitution of objectivity:
different practices give birth to different objects because different practices establish
different patterns of normativity. As we have seen, the process of self-articulation of a
practice begins with the definition of those traits of a thing that are considered relevant
for reaching the particular result that is constitutive of that practice. At this level of
articulation,  the  normative  structure  of the  practice  takes  the  form  of  a  series  of
restrictions on the richness  of  the surrounding environment.  So,  for  instance,  if  the
practice  in  which  an  agent  is  involved  is  that  of  searching  for  food,  the  normative
restrictions imposed by the structure of the activity will be something like the following:
try to locate the position of those things that seems to be edible; find or construct an
object that will enable you to reach them; be sure that the ground is firm, and so on. As a
consequence  of  this  act  of  constitution,  things  become  objects.  Dewey  has  correctly
pointed out  that  objects are  “things  with a  meaning,”  where meaning here  is  to  be
conceived  as  the  explicitly recognized relation  between an  act  and  its  possible  future
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consequences (Dewey 1925/2008: 132). It is in the context of a practice that such an act of
“semantic  transubstantiation” takes  place.  Indeed,  it  is  only  within the horizon of  a
practice  that  a  norm is  established  which  states  what  aspects  of  a  things  count  as
semantically relevant.
29 The fact that the normative relation between an act and its consequences is to be explicitly
recognized in order for a thing to become an object is important for understanding the
nature  of  common-sense  practices  and  their  differences  from  the  practices  that
constitute  the  scientific  image  of  the  world.  I  suggest  interpreting  the  distinction
between things and objects as the distinction between implicit and explicit normativity.
This interpretative proposal aims to preserve the Kantian constructivist insight according
to  which  concept  and  object  share  the  same  semantic  content  without  denying  the
‘phenomenological’  difference  between  perceiving  and  conceiving.  According  to  this
view,  things  are  meaningful  –  we  never  encounter  in  our  experience  something
completely devoid of meaning – but the meanings that constitute them are only implicitly
recognized  connections  rather  than  explicitly formulated  relations.  As  Dewey  once
pointed out, things are habits turned inside out – that is, norms of behaviour that are
unreflectively had by an agent (Dewey 1922/2008: 127).  Objects are these very norms
made explicit and used within the context of a practice. So a thing to which we refer with
the word ‘chair’ becomes a chair only when it is used to sit on. Before that moment, it is
only a bundle of potentialities that wait for a realization.
30 The  distinction  between  common-sense  and  the  scientific  constitution  of  objects  is
grounded precisely  upon the  different  ways  in  which things  can be  articulated  into
objects.  In the case of common-sense practices,  the effort of articulation is somehow
limited to the act of confirming the qualities of the things that enter in those activities.
The very fact that the language we use in our habitual transactions with the world – the
language that makes available to us the possibility of having a world in view, to use a
formula coined by McDowell (2009) – implicitly advances an interpretation of how to
treat  things  is  the  best  evidence  of  the  constraints  imposed  upon  our  capacity  to
articulate  by  the nature  of  these  things.  Here  the  process  of  articulation  of  the
normativity implicit in habitual transactions with the world comes as nearest as possible
to  pure  representation.  We  call  a  thing  ‘a  chair’  even  though  we  are  not  actually
interested in sitting on it, and when we use a chair as a chair it seems that we are simply
taking notice of what the object really is. In common-sense practices we feel a normative
constraint to articulate the semantic content of a thing in a certain direction, and to
realize the potentialities of that thing along a line determined by its very nature. This has
much to do with the ‘givenness’ of perception. When I look at a chair, I cannot help but
see that particular chair with all its sensible qualities, no matter how much effort I make
to see differently. There is nothing that my will can do to change what I see. Similarly,
when I try to actualize the potentialities of a thing within the context of a common-sense
practice,  the  determinacy  of  its  affordances  commands  (puts  constraints  upon)  my
attempt to articulate.
31 The conclusion that can be drawn from these premises is that, in the case of common-
sense practices, there is no substantial semantic difference between objects and things.
What we do with a thing on an unreflective level is almost identical to what we do with
the articulated object on a reflective level.7 This remark should not be taken to imply that
the potentialities of a thing are completely actualized in the common-sense practices in
which  it  enters.  It  only  means  that  common-sense  practices  cannot  articulate  and
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actualize potentialities different from, and other than, those they have already articulated
and actualized. In other words, it means that the habits through which we pre-constitute
the world are nothing but past common-sense practices that have become ingrained in
our  biological  constitution.  Things  are  common-sense  things  –  that  is,  bundles  of
relations between actions and consequences originally established within the context of
previous and different common-sense practices and now apprehended in an unreflective
way.
32 It  is  only  within  the  process  of  the  constitution  of  scientific  objectivity  that  the
obviousness and non-problematic nature of  the process of  articulation of  meaning is
finally overcome. Generally speaking, scientific practices consist in the elaboration of
schemes of explanation that aim, in the final analysis, to account for some aspect of the
world of common-sense. In order to achieve this goal, the particular quality of a certain
class of common-sense things that form the subject-matter of inquiry is to be abstracted
from the context in which it ‘naturally’ presents to us, and is put in a new and larger
context.  As  a  consequence  of  this  act  of  abstraction,  which  amounts  to  an  act  of
substitution and replacement, the quality under consideration enters into new relations
and  acquires  new  meanings.  The  potentialities  of  a  thing  are  thus  articulated  and
actualized in a new set of highly-refined objects whose nature is determined wholly intra-
theoretically. Objects of physics are no different from the physical theories that speak of
them. In this particular case, ontological constructivism shows its theoretical fertility,
and  finds  important  confirmation  in  the  fact  that  the  meaning  of  scientific  objects
coincides completely with their existence.
33 The  process  of  constitution  of  scientific  objectivity  depends,  therefore,  upon  the
construction of theoretical frameworks and specialized languages in the light of which we
interpret the quality of the things that we seek to understand. Theoretical frameworks
are linguistic entities that enable us to construct linguistic relations among apparently
unrelated elements. As Dewey states in his Logic, thanks to (scientific) language, smoke
can be related not simply and not only to the particular fire that is its cause or to the
general  notion of  fire,  but  also  to:  “such apparently  unrelated meanings  as  friction,
changes of temperature, oxygen, molecular constitution, and, by intervening meaning-
symbols, to the laws of thermodynamics” (Dewey 1938/2008: 58). The liberating power of
language is the condition of possibility of the freedom we have to articulate the implicit
normativity of things according to our explanatory interests. From a logical point of view,
indeed,  the  act  of  choosing  one  particular  theoretical  framework  over  another  is  a
completely free act. The choice of the standpoint from which to look at things – that is,
the choice of the axioms and postulates that constitute scientific objects of a particular
type – is a free decision which precedes and grounds the constraints which we will meet
in the practice that we have chosen to undertake. In a sense, Rorty is right when he says
that “truth is not out there,” and that there is nothing in the world – that is, in the things
of common-sense – that forces us to speak in a certain way (Rorty 1989:  5).  We can
describe a chair as a physical object, as a historical object, as an object subjected to the
laws of property, and so on, and it is completely up to us which of the qualities of the
thing we wish to articulate and realize. In all these cases, however, our decision is not the
final judge of the objective validity of the choice we have made. The final judge is, once
again, the practice itself, and more precisely the potentiality of the selected theoretical
framework to satisfy the potentialities of the things of common-sense.
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34 So, whilst in scientific practices we are not faced with the strong constraints that we meet
in common-sense practices,  our decisions are nevertheless subjected to some form of
normative constraint which makes it possible to tell objectively valid statements from
those that cannot pass the test of experience. It is possible to conclude therefore that
there is a common structure of objectivity that encompasses the two senses of normative
constraint defined above. In both cases, indeed, what lies at the basis of the possibility of
achieving objectivity is the capacity to articulate the implicit normativity of things – a
capacity which, in turn, is founded upon the metaphysical assumption that nature is rich
enough and complex enough to support different principles of construction of objects.
Consequently, the idea of the articulation of potentialities is the backbone of the concept
of pragmatist objectivity and the ultimate ground of the notion of success, from which
pragmatist objectivity has usually been traced. As a matter of fact, the success of a certain
norm in bringing about the desired result is not the last word that can be said about
objectivity.  The success of  a norm can be further explained in terms of  its  being an
accurate and normatively responsible articulation of what nature is – of its being part of a
practice in which some potentialities of nature find proper realization.
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NOTES
1. Margolis furnishes the clearest analysis of the post-Kantian roots of pragmatism: on this point
see in particular Margolis 2012a. For a critical discussion of Margolis’ claim of the indissolubility
of realism and idealism see Gronda 2012, and Margolis’ reply in Margolis 2012b.
2. Dewey has shown that meanings can be experienced in a direct or in a reflexive way. In the
first case they are experienced as habitual patterns of behaviour. In the second case they are
experienced as ideal plans of action the validity of which consists in their capacity to provide the
agent with a set of tools that enable them to reconstruct a contradictory situation. In both cases,
an object is everything whose action can be understood and foreseen on the basis of a general
rule.
3. The notion of affordance is obviously drawn from Gibson, who also coined the term: “The
affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either
for good or ill. The verb to afford is found in the dictionary, but the noun affordance is not. I have
made it up. I mean by it something that refers to both the environment and the animal in a way
that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment”
(Gibson 1979/2014: 119).
4. This  distinction corresponds  to  the  one  that  Dewey makes  in  his  Studies  in  Logical  Theory
between the structural and the dynamic aspect of experience: “[t]he distinction between each
attitude  and  function  and  its  predecessor  and  successor  is  serial,  dynamic,  operative.  The
distinctions  within any  given  operation  or  function  are  structural,  contemporaneous,  and
distributive.  Thinking  follows,  we  will  say,  striving,  and  doing  follows  thinking  […].  But
coincident, simultaneous, and correspondent within doing is the distinction of doer and of deed;
within the function of thought, of thinking and material thought upon; within the function of
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striving, of obstacle and aim, of means and end” (Dewey 1903/2008: 311). For a useful discussion
of this aspect of Dewey’s thought, see Frega (2006: 46).
5. It is true that in some cases the desired result can be obtained without changing the initial,
objective conditions that originates the process of inquiry. Mind-altering substances can reduce
or eliminate anxiety and sorrow even though the objective conditions are left unmodified. But in
these cases the satisfaction of the need is only apparent, and the symptoms of the problem will
appear  again  and  again.  Dewey’s  well-known  thesis  that  emotions  are  tertiary  qualities  is
intended to highlight precisely this point, that the objectivity of emotions is a consequence of
their being natural events grounded on our biological constitution. 
6. For an analysis of the notion of articulation as a moment of a practice, see Frega 2010.
7. Since common-sense practices are the simplest and most basic articulation of human nature,
and  since  they  are  the  manifestation  of  our  biological  endowment,  they  are  relatively
unmodifiable. Owing to their stability, habits formed in past transactions with the environment
provide  reliable  norms  for  present  action.  The  relative  unmodifiability  of  common-sense
practices warrants the possibility of realizing the potentialities that things present to us as their
affordances. But the platitudinousness of this particular kind of articulation of normativity is the
price we pay for the certainty of its success.
ABSTRACTS
In this paper, I address the question of the nature and ground of objectivity, with the aim to
develop  a  pragmatist  account  of  its  distinctive  features.  Traditionally,  pragmatism has  been
considered  as  an  alternative  to  Kantian  approaches.  The  aim of  the  paper  is  to  argue  that,
contrary  to  the  received view,  a  consistent  pragmatist  theory of  objectivity  should preserve
many insights  of  Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy.  My thesis  is  that  Kantian notions  of
spontaneity,  activity  and  objectivity  can  be  fruitfully  reformulated  and  translated  into
pragmatist terms. The key notion here is that of practices.  It  is only within the context of a
practice that concepts can be successfully applied to experience. The intrinsic normativity of
practices establishes different levels of objectivity. The paper defends a pluralistic view of reality,
insisting on the irreducibility of common-sense objectivity to scientific objectivity. At the same
time, it is maintained that common-sense practices have a primacy over scientific practices, and
that  scientific  objects  are  constructed  out  of  common-sense  objects  through  a  process  of
articulation of the potentialities of the latter.
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